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Abstract
One of the driving forces behind the development of 3G
systems is the potential to deliver complex content to
consumers. This is evident from the growing collaboration
between broadcast and mobile network operators, and the
expectation that future broadcast receivers will be able
to forward content to mobile devices. One challenge in
providing such a service is the requirement for content
protection. An aspect of this that is particularly relevant
to mobile systems is the ability to control where content
is viewed. Although 3G networks can provide location of
a user’s receiver, this device may be in a different location
from the device that renders the content. Thus the pro-
vider cannot be certain where the content will be viewed.
This paper proposes two protocols that will provide the
location of the end device in a secure manner that can be
trusted by the content provider.
1 Introduction
Advances in mobile communications technology have pro-
vided the potential to deliver many new services to sub-
scribers. New businesses models are anticipated where
interactive multimedia services will be available to mobile
subscribers instantly and at any location. The removal
of barriers to the delivery of such services raises issues of
content protection and digital rights management (DRM).
The nature of digital multimedia content lends itself to
theft by copying. Content providers are naturally concer-
ned about this, and are seeking the development of tech-
nology to minimise this risk to their business [9]. Conse-
quently there is increasing interest in DRM languages
[1, 8], and system architectures [3, 12,13].
Successful DRM architectures must be trusted by the
content provider. This requires trust in the platform that
supports the DRM system, and trust in the sources of data
that determine the conditions under which the content
may be used. The ability to manipulate these usage condi-
tions represents a threat to any DRM system.
An example of this threat is in the implementation of re-
gional blackouts. Broadcasters are often required to res-
trict broadcasts of certain content to specific geographical
regions, or specific dates and times. The reasons for doing
so could be to meet local regulations, or to meet commer-
cial terms agreed with the content provider.
For example, coverage of a sporting event may be forbid-
den in regions close to the stadium while the event is ta-
king place. Subscribers in other regions may pay to view
the live event. Immediately after the event the content
may be freely available in all regions.
Currently, broadcasters use conditional access systems to
scramble such services in a manner that can only be un-
scrambled by receivers with specific embedded regional
codes. The assumption is that the receivers remain re-
latively static. Mechanisms have been proposed to track
the location of receivers using telecommunications return
channels, GPS technology, and satellite ranging [6]. These
solutions however, are not intended to apply to low cost
mobile devices with no satellite receiver.
The problem is compounded where receivers have the abi-
lity to store and forward content. Current solutions ensure
that the point of reception is outside the blackout region.
What is now required is proof that the end user is outside
the blackout region. To achieve this, the location of any
device capable of rendering content must be made avai-
lable to the DRM application in a trustworthy manner.
Moreover, it is the user who is most likely to try to de-
ceive the application.
Other authors have focussed on problem of location awa-
reness to assist with routing [7] or to determine a device’s
location with respect to some fixed transmitter [2,10]. The
issue of trust, however, is not relevant to these applica-
tions. The recently proposed Echo protocol [11] does ad-
dress the problem of trustworthy location data, but this
mechanism is designed for physical access control and uses
ultrasonics and fixed transmitters. It is not intended to
cover large geographical regions.
This paper examines how secure time and location infor-
mation can be provided in a manner that can be trusted
by a third party. The use of trusted hardware is consi-
dered followed by the proposal of two protocols that ad-
dress the problem without using trusted hardware. The
methods proposed also reduce the opportunity to forward
legitimately received content on to third parties.
2 Preliminaries
The model under consideration is illustrated in Fig. 1, and
is designed to reflect the following scenario: A broadcaster
purchases content from a content provider in order to sell
this content to a subscriber. The content provider is free to
place restrictions on the location and time that his content
may be viewed. The broadcaster then delivers the content
to the subscriber’s set-top box. The set-top box is then
able to forward the content, via an intermediary network,
to the user’s laptop, where it can be rendered. There are
five entities in this model:
A content provider who provides encrypted digital
content.
A broadcast network that initially delivers the content
to the user.
A set top box, (STB) which is the initial receiver of the
content. This device is controlled by the broadcaster and
provides a secure platform to manage viewing rights. The
user, however, may be able to manipulate data that enters
and leaves this device.
An intermediary network that forwards the data from
the set-top box to the end viewing device. Note that part
of this network could be under the control of the user.
An end device, that is under the control of the user, on
which the content is to be finally displayed.
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Figure 1: The Network Model
An important aspect of the above model is the interme-
diary network. The set-top box and the end device do
not communicate directly but are connected by an in-
termediary network. It is important that some part of
this intermediary network is trusted by the content pro-
vider. However, part of the network may be controlled
by the user, this models the situation where the end de-
vice is connected to a trusted network via a second device
controlled by the user such as a cellular phone.
This means that the user may attempt to alter, delete or
STB denotes the initial receiver
ED denotes the end device
IN denotes the intermediary network
LS denotes the location server closest to ED
CA denotes a trusted certification authority
CertX is a public key certificate for entity X
KX,Y denotes a secret key possessed only by X
and Y
IDX denotes the unique ID of entity X
RX is a random number issued by entity X
ti is a time stamp issued at time = i
dti,j is the time interval between ti and tj
dtmax is an upper limit on a time interval used to
determine how close, geographically, one
device is to another.
time is the time and date data provided by LS
loc is the location data provided by LS
EK(Z) is the result of the encipherment of data
Z with a symmetric algorithm using the
key K
MACK(Z) is the Message Authentication Code, ge-
nerated by hashing data Z with the key
K
SX(Z) is entity X’s private signature transfor-
mation operating on data Z
VX(SX , Z) is entity X’s public verification trans-
formation operating on X’s signature
SX(Z), and data Z
Table 1: Notation
insert messages at any stage between the set-top box and
the end device. This also allows the user to forward the
content some distance away from the trusted network.
In describing the protocols the notation listed in Table 1
is used, and the following conditions are assumed:
1. STB and ED have a secure execution environment.
2. STB and ED have a tamper-proof data storage area.
3. All cryptographic processing on STB and ED is car-
ried out in the secure execution environment.
4. Only applications running in the secure execution en-
vironment have access to the tamper-proof data sto-
rage areas in the STB and the ED.
5. At least one authenticated key, KS,E , is shared by
STB and ED and stored in the tamper-proof storage.
6. At least one of the ED or STB possesses a public
verification transform, VCA, for a certification autho-
rity CA, stored in its tamper-proof data storage area.
7. The initial receiver, STB, possesses a DRM applica-
tion stored in its tamper-proof data storage area.
8. The initial receiver, STB, has knowledge of the usage
criteria for each service received.
3 Using Trusted Hardware
An obvious way to provide trustworthy location data in-
volves using hardware that can be trusted by the content
provider. The end device may have a trusted hardware
component that provides its current location and the cur-
rent time. A global satellite navigation system such as
GPS [5] or the proposed Galileo system [4] could accom-
plish this. This solution, however, is likely to be expensive.
Alternatively, the end device could have direct access to
the trusted part of the intermediary network. The network
could then offer an extra service: on request, the network
could report the current time and the location of the ga-
teway from which the end device is receiving content.
If the content provider could trust that the DRM applica-
tion is receiving information directly from the third party
network then this would solve the problem. This solu-
tion, however, restricts the end device to those that can be
connected directly to the trusted network. For example, it
would be possible to view the content on a cellular phone,
but it would not be possible to forward the content to a
laptop connected to this phone.
4 A Software Based Protocol
If the link between the trusted network and the end device
cannot be trusted then there is a fundamental problem:
although it is easy to ensure that time/location data has
come from a trusted network, it is difficult to ensure that
the data has not traveled a long distance. We say that
data that has not been sent too far is near. It is also
important to know that data is not a replay of some earlier
execution of the protocol. We say that data that has been
recently generated (in particular data that is not being
replayed) is fresh. It is necessary that the data can meet
both these conditions if it is to be trusted.
Consider the following service offered by the intermediary
network. Suppose that, on receiving a random nonce from
an end device, a network gateway signs a data string
consisting of that nonce, the gateways location and the
current time. Obviously the use of digital signatures im-
plies the need for the end device to trust the network’s
public key, but this could be solved by means of a cer-
tificate supplied by the content provider. An end device
could then accurately validate its time and location by
sending a nonce to the nearest trusted network gateway
and checking that: the response has been signed correctly
(entity authentication); the response includes the correct
nonce (freshness); and the time taken between sending
the request and receiving the response is less than some
threshold determined by the content provider (nearness).
If all of the above conditions hold then the DRM applica-
tion can trust the time and location information contained
in the response. The following describes such a protocol
in detail.
In addition to the conditions of section 2 it is assumed
that the end device, ED, possesses a DRM application
stored in its tamper-proof data storage area. The protocol
is initiated by the user requesting a service on ED which
causes the DRM application to be loaded and the following
steps executed. The protocol is illustrated in figure 2.
1. ED → STB :
Request for usage criteria || IDService
2. STB → ED :
IDService || usage criteria ||MACKS,E (usage criteria)
3. ED calculates: MACKS,E (usage criteria)
and compares the result with the received MAC to
verify the origin and integrity of the usage criteria.
4. ED → IN : Request ID of nearest location server
5. IN → ED : IDLS
6. ED → CA :
Request certificate for location server || IDLS
7. CA→ ED : CertLS
8. ED executes VCA(CertLS) to verify VLS
If VLS is verified, then it is stored in the tamper-proof
data storage area on ED.
9. ED generates a random nonce, RED
10. The DRM application running on ED generates ti
and stores it in the tamper-proof data storage area.
11. ED → LS : RED
12. LS → ED : time || loc || SLS(RED || time || loc)
13. The DRM application running on ED generates tj
and compares it with ti. If dti,j > dtmax then ED
is geographically too far from LS to provide reliable
data. Otherwise, ED checks the validity of the signa-
ture provided by the location server using VLS .
This verifies the origin of the time and location data
and verifies that the data has not been replayed. The
DRM application can then check the usage criteria
and request, or halt, delivery of the service.
14. ED → STB :
Request for service || time || MACKS,E (time)
The MAC authenticates the origin and integrity of
the request and prevents replay.
This is necessary to defeat a user who is receiving a
free service from injecting a request for a restricted
service in step 1, blocking subsequent messages, then
injecting or replaying a request for service at this step.
15. STB → ED : EKS,E (Service)
STB then delivers the service identified by IDService
received in the preceding request for usage criteria.
16. The protocol repeats from step 9 to step 13 at regular
time intervals determined by the DRM application.
This ensures that ED remains within the permitted
location.
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Figure 2: A time/location protocol (I)
This protocol requires access to a trustworthy interval ti-
mer to compute dti,j . This requirement, however, can
be removed if the content is provided in real-time with a
logical interval timer embedded in the data stream.
This scheme depends on the allowed time delay, dtmax.
Choosing a value for dtmax could be difficult. If the thre-
shold is too large then data will be able to travel out of
the acceptable zone but if the threshold is too small then
network jitter might cause blackouts for legitimate users.
The choice of threshold becomes even harder if the net-
work delay in the mobile network is variable. One possible
solution to this problem is to allow the set-top box or the
intermediary network to determine the threshold based on
information received from the content provider and statis-
tics from the trusted part of the intermediary network.
The disadvantage of this protocol is that it may be com-
putationally expensive. The end device needs to generate
a suitably random nonce, and the network needs to gene-
rate a signature which the end device needs to verify. This
puts a strain on the end device, which may not have the
computational power to verify signatures quickly; and the
network, which may have to sign lots of messages quickly.
5 Reducing the Computational Load
To reduce the load on the end device, the following proto-
col, illustrated in Fig 3, moves the bulk of the computation
to the set-top box. The set-top box also has access to a
better source of nonces which may be derived cryptogra-
phically from the random keys that are used to scramble
content. Typically these keys are changed several times a
minute.
We assume that, in connecting to the network, the end
device has been authenticated, both to the network as a
device and to the set-top box as the intended recipient of
the data stream. The protocol then proceeds as follows:
1. ED → STB :
Request for usage criteria || IDService
2. STB executes the DRM application and determines
the usage criteria for the service.
3. STB → IN :
Request ID of location server nearest to ED.
4. IN → STB : IDLS
5. STB → CA :
Request certificate for location server || IDLS
6. CA→ STB : CertLS
7. STB executes VCA(CertLS) to verify VLS .
VLS is stored in the tamper-proof data storage area
on STB.
8. STB generates a random nonce RSTB.
9. STB → LS : RSTB || IDED
10. LS generates ti and stores ti indexed by IDED.
11. LS → ED : RSTB
12. ED → LS :MACKS,E (RSTB)
13. LS generates tj and compares it with ti indexed by
IDED. If dti,j > dtmax then ED is geographically
too far from LS to provide reliable data.
14. LS → STB : time || loc || MACKS,E (RSTB) ||
SLS( time || loc || MACKS,E (RSTB))
15. STB then checks the validity of the signature provi-
ded by the location server using VLS . This verifies
the origin of the time and location data.
16. The STB then verifies MACKS,E (RSTB) to authen-
ticate ED.
If the MAC cannot be verified then ED cannot be
trusted. If the MAC is validated, then STB can trust
that the device communicating with LS is ED, and
that the data received has not been replayed.
17. The usage conditions (time and location) are then
passed to the DRM application, which permits, or
denies, delivery of the service (IDService) to ED as
appropriate.
18. STB → ED : EKS,E (Service)
19. The protocol repeats from step 8 to step 17 at regular
time intervals determined by the DRM application.
This ensures that ED remains within the permitted
location.
Again, this protocol ensures freshness by the use of nonces,
nearness by the use of a time interval, entity authentica-
tion of the intermediary network by the use of a digital
signature and entity authentication of the end device by
the use of a shared key. The protocol requires the same
measure of trust in the intermediary network as in the
previous protocol but the trust in the user’s end device is
reduced, as is the computational load on this end device.
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Figure 3: A time/location protocol (II)
6 Conclusion
Three methods for securely determining that time and the
location of an end device have been presented: one that
relies on trusted hardware and two software protocols col-
laborating with a trusted intermediary network.
An issue that has not been discussed is the effect on qua-
lity of service due to the increased computational loads.
The protocols may also be vulnerable to denial of service
attacks where an attacker may block or delay any of the
messages causing the DRM software to believe that a le-
gitimate user is in a blackout region.
The protocols could also place a large computational load
on the intermediary network that signs the messages. A
time-memory trade-off can be performed here, instead of
signing a message each time, the intermediary network
could negotiate a shared symmetric key with the message
recipient and use a message authentication code rather
than a digital signature. However in this case the inter-
mediary network would have to store a symmetric key for
each open session, and this could be equally undesirable.
The development of protocols that place less demanding
computational loads on the intermediary network remains
an open problem.
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